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ARE ATTACHED:
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ICS 7035-88

ICS 7046-88

SUBJECT:

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ICS 7046-88
24 March 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Director, Intelligence Community Staff

SUBJECT: Follow-up Letter

REFERENCES: A. Letter to DDCI fm Codevilla, dated 22 Jan 88, subject:
Proposed Study
B. Memo to DDCI fm DDR&E/ICS, dated 10 Mar 88, subject:
Feedback

1. Action Requested: That you sign the attached letter to Mr. Angelo Codevilla regarding a study he proposed to you.

2. Background: A few weeks ago, you received Reference A from Angelo Codevilla and Bill Harris. They proposed that they do a study for you about creating an intelligence architecture for the 1990s in order to maximize the usefulness of intelligence systems against the USSR and especially in wartime. A set of correspondence is on the left side of this folder.

3. You sent the proposers an interim letter in which you told them that you would look into the issue and would be responding to them shortly.

4. At about the same time, you asked [redacted], DDR&E, to look into this matter for you with a number of senior officials of US intelligence. [redacted] was to explore with these senior officials both the merit of such a study, as well as a more generic piece of work beginning with the classic "clean slate."

5. He did that with the results that you read in Reference B. In your reaction to that correspondence, you asked that we draft a negative reply built around the issue of sensitivity and the need for clearances well beyond what they had when they worked at the SSCI. You also asked that we make note

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SUBJECT: Follow-up Letter

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of the pending DoD effort along the same lines and you asked that this warm and gracious letter cite in-depth conversations with senior officials of US intelligence. To that end, we wrote the attached letter.

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6. Recommendation: That you sign the attached letter.

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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

ICS 7041 88

Washington, D.C. 20505

March 25, 1988

Mr. Angelo M. Codevilla
Hoover Institution
Stanford, California 94305-6010

Dear Angelo:

STAT I am writing as a followup to my letter to you of 10 February. [] has reported back to me on his discussions with senior Intelligence Community managers about feasibility, accesses, and alternatives.

Without beating around the bush, there was agreement in the Community that the topic of your proposed study fits into a category "too sensitive to be done fully with complete access by anyone outside of government." More specifically, the proposed study would involve access and clearances substantially beyond those you had when you worked for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

At the same time, there is a major effort about to begin within the Department of Defense on a subject very closely related to your proposal.

The idea of a classified outside examination or design of a different 1990s from that which would otherwise be the case for US intelligence seemed interesting to me, and I regret we cannot go forward. Even so, I appreciate the spirit and initiative behind your proposal and hope that you will continue to send along ideas, articles and, when you think appropriate, proposals.

Give me a call the next time you plan to be in Washington. Maybe we could catch up over a sandwich.

STAT Regards,

[]

Robert M. Gates

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ICS 7035-88

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PRIOR PAPERS ON THIS SUBJECT: NO YES

PRIOR CORRES SENT TO: _____

OTHER COMMENTS: _____

*Copy returned
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w/ DDCI notes 14 MAR 88*

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ICS 7035-88
10 March 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Acting Director, Intelligence Community Staff *[Signature]*

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FROM:
Deputy Director for Requirements and Evaluation, ICS

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SUBJECT: Feedback

REFERENCES:

- A. Memo fr DDCI to DDR&E, dated 10 Feb 88, subject:
Attached Letter from Angelo Codevilla
- B. Letter to Codevilla fm DDCI, dated 10 Feb 88, subject:
Proposed Study
- C. Letter to DDCI fm Codevilla, dated 22 Jan 88, subject:
Proposed Study

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1. This memorandum responds to your request in reference A (copy of set of references in folder, on left). I apologize for the delay; the effort took a good bit longer than I had expected.

2. You asked that I engage privately several senior officers of US intelligence about a study, which two individuals had proposed jointly on the subject of US intelligence capabilities, especially in the future, to support the fighting of wars (among other things). More specifically, you asked for reactions to three propositions:

- o The merit of a study along the lines proposed, regardless of who might do it (i.e., in or out of the Intelligence Community).
- o Preparation of the study by these two officers, including their access to many, if not most, collection systems.
- o If the Community reaction to the above is negative, the possibility of a small contract in which they would address the questions they have raised in terms of generic analysis and recommendations. For example, if starting with a clean slate, how would they design an optimum system mix from the perspective they have raised.

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3. In conducting this discreet inquiry, I wrote a similar memorandum-- which states the context of the request--and then went to see the following people personally with the correspondence:

- 25X1 o NSA: [] Deputy Director for Plans and Policy, and []
25X1 [] the then-to-be-announced new Chairman of the SIGINT
Committee.
- 25X1 o CIA: []
- 25X1 o DIA: [] Executive Director; and [] Chief of
the Collection Division.
- o Air Force: Jimmie Hill and Major General Hard, Staff Director.
- o State/INR: Curt Kamman.
- 25X1 o []

In each case, I engaged the substance of the matter with them and asked them, at the minimum, to give me their views--either then or to get back to me in a couple of days with any additional views for their heads-of-agencies' views. Most people gave me an opinion straightaway; some did both. []

4. As a result of all that talk, it is clear that there is no common agreement or theme from all of these people. Collectively, their views cover the spectrum and most people are sharply negative--including the extreme view of: "No way, never...." This common disagreement includes:

- o The value of any such study.
- o The context in which it would be done.
- o The wisdom of having these two fellows do the work.

In fact, the views I received directly (in quotes) or were reported to me can be summarized as:

- o NSA: "No way...never."
- o CIA: Dick Kerr: Never, especially by outsiders.
E. Hineman: Might be useful; can't say no; do generic.
- 25X1 o DIA: [] "Deeply skeptical of the value."

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SUBJECT: Feedback

- o AF: Jimmie Hill: "Generic not bad to do; nervous with these guys; outsiders might help with DDCI; use better guys; don't just focus on war."

P. Aldridge: B.S.; useless.

- o State: C. Kamman: "Need not high."

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- o "Doubtful of values, but could be useful; perhaps do Secret-level work on emerging commercial technologies."

5. In contrast, what is clear from all of this, is that it would be politically costly to a degree to have this work done by these two fellows and provide them access to all of the classified information to do the job properly. In my opinion, the following organizations--or key leaders therein--figuratively would "lay an egg" on security grounds alone: CIA, NSA, Air Force, [redacted] Moreover, I think the topic of the proposed study is one which fits a category I call "too sensitive to be done with complete access by anyone outside of government." While it may be that such topics are so sensitive that even government people cannot get the study done well, it certainly is arguable also that outsiders cannot do the work either. [redacted]

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6. Further, I am skeptical whether either of these two fellows have ever had any of the "exotic" clearances for the topics they want to study. At present, security advises that:

- o Mr. Codevilla has no active access in the computer. [redacted]

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- o Mr. Harris currently is sponsored by State for [redacted] He once held at the SSCI: [redacted] and several of the [redacted] accesses. [redacted]

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7. On substantive grounds, I believe that most of US intelligence would agree with two basic points:

- o If you want the study done right, don't use these guys because there is little to argue that they have any unique or even useful substantive contributions to make.

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SUBJECT: Feedback

- o But, if you want to take the chance that--perhaps in the broad sense of "alternative hypotheses"--these guys have (or will have) a view worth having, then fund an overview-type piece of work.

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The central question for you is whether this is worth the price?!

8. In any case, if you are to act positively, my concrete proposals are:

- o Set aside the idea of having any such work done on any highly classified basis by these two, or any other set of, officers outside the government. It is not worth the price.
- o Do ask them to do a piece of work along the lines proposed, focused on policy and overall architecture, but at the Secret non-SCI level. Even such a study might be helpful and these two people have some powerful insights on occasion.

Even this study will be at least sort of painful: US intelligence will whine and obstruct to a degree and these two officers likely will raise a heap of problems associated with implementation.

For example, the proposers will want to get briefed by several elements of US intelligence. You can expect to hear cries about the drain on precious people, the security of it all, and so on.

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9. If you accept these ideas, or anything close to it, you also have to find:

- o Some contract money; i.e., about \$300,000 to 400,000 I would guess, but perhaps more. I did not try to gauge the cost of the study or to find money.

Wherever the money comes from, I would use Dick Kerr's contract team to formally engage the proposers and do all of that legally based, and important, work correctly.

- o Someone to oversee the contract for you, unless you care to try to do it yourself--which is not useful or wise, for all of the obvious reasons.

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Although I have not had time to discuss the issue with who is on vacation until 11 March, I think he is a good choice to list on paper. I suspect I can guess precisely who he will turn to for help.

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10. At the same time, and beyond all of the previous substance, there is a big-time political problem associated with the concept of this study. The DCI and you must get Secretary Carlucci and Secretary Taft exposed to this idea

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SUBJECT: Feedback

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and in support of it. The obvious place to do that is at a breakfast, but you might want me to write a letter for you to send to Secretary Taft about it. When Bill Harris came to see me several months ago, one of the most central points in that semicoherent discussion was getting DoD (both OSD and JCS) involved. I told Bill Harris then, and I still believe, that this study has no chance of success if DoD does not know about it and support it. But why DoD would want to support the effort is hard to figure out.

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11. In any case, towards a productive end, I have written a letter for you to sign to Mr. Codevilla for these two officers. Once you sign this (or some) letter, we later will engage US intelligence on your behalf to support the study as is needed and wise. If not, that is okay, too.

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12. Since there is some good chance you will turn to Dick Kerr to help do the work, you also ought to talk with him.

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13. In due course, I owe several people in US intelligence some feedback myself.

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14. What else may I do for you?

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Attachment: a/s

DDCI:

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reminds me that I am not clear on my view. To be explicit, if I were you I would not do this-- especially alone. If you still want to anyway, do it joint with DoD.

The letter is here because I suspect you want to proceed.

Either way, we'll help.

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SUBJECT: Feedback (U)

DISTRIBUTION: (ICS 7035-88 w/att. ICS 7041-88)

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DCI/OD/ICS

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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Mr. Angelo M. Codevilla
Hoover Institution
Stanford, California 94305-6010

Dear Angelo:

I am writing as a followup to my letter of 10 February.

STAT As you recall, I advised you then that I would ask [] to discuss your proposal with selected Community managers in terms of feasibility, accesses, and alternatives.

STAT [] has reported back to me on his private research. The upshot of that work is that I want you and Bill Harris to conduct a study along the lines of your proposal, but with one variation. I agree that this study would be for Director Webster and myself, and that the range of issues would span the Intelligence Community's overall responsibilities. In addition, I believe this work should be done at the Secret non-SCI level. I believe a lot can be done at that classification level--especially in the areas of policy and overall architecture.

STAT Trusting that you will still agree that this work greatly needs to be done, I have asked [] Director of the Intelligence Community Staff, to oversee this work with you for me. This arrangement will be productive for both sides and will increase the probability that you will get the support you need.

STAT Even though [] will manage this study contract for me, I want you to feel free to keep me informed, both in general terms over the phone and more greater detail in person.

I look forward to your positive reaction and making progress in designing a different 1990s than otherwise would be the case.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates

SUBJECT: DDCI Letter to Codevilla re Special Study

DISTRIBUTION: (ICS 7041-88)

Original - Mr. Codevilla

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DCI/OD/ICS



(8 Mar 88)

10 February 1988

REFERENCE

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MEMORANDUM FOR:
DDR&E/ICS

FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Attached Letter from Angelo Codevilla

1. I would be interested in the Intelligence Community Staff reaction to the attached proposal. Feel free to consult with Jimmy Hill and similar level officials at NSA and DIA. I would be interested in the reaction to three propositions:

- the merit of a study along the lines proposed regardless of who might do it (i.e., in or out of the Intelligence Community);
- preparation of the study by Angelo and Bill, including their access to many, if not most, collection systems;
- if the Community reaction to the above is negative, the possibility of a small contract in which they would address the questions they have raised in terms of generic analysis and recommendations. For example, if starting with a clean slate, how would they design an optimum system mix from the perspective they have raised.

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2. I would appreciate a response, with a proposed reply to Codevilla, by the end of the month. Try to make the inquiries as discreet as possible (I don't want people spreading this around).

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Robert M. Gates

Attachments:

Incoming from Codevilla
Response from DDCI to Codevilla

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CL By Signer
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HOOVER INSTITUTION

ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE

Stanford, California 94305-6010



January 22, 1988

Mr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia 23665

Dear Bob:

As you know, the technical systems for intelligence collection that the United States possesses today, and that it will possess ten years hence (unless budgets change substantially) were conceived in the mid-1970s on the basis of certain assumptions about the world. Among these were peace between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, compliance with certain kinds of arms control agreements, and a host of details about Soviet weapons systems. But in recent years many have realized that the nature of the Soviet target is not what was assumed in the 1970s. Moreover, it should be no surprise that peacetime intelligence collectors would not be particularly useful in time of war.

We propose to study how the intelligence community might modify current intelligence systems (including ground based components), and/or modify how they are used, in order to maximize their usefulness against the Soviet target that will exist five to ten years from now, and above all to maximize their usefulness in time of war. We also propose to study how the intelligence community's (including some D.O.D. elements) plans for procurement and R&D would have to change in the next two to three years in order to provide for better mix of peacetime and wartime capabilities about the mid 1990s. We would provide a framework for deciding on a mix of collection assets. Moreover, we wish to consider alternative strategies for procurement that may increase the availability and utility of intelligence in wartime, even under budgetary constraints.

We propose to do this as consultants to you. Bill would take leave-of-absence from RAND. We propose also to obtain the help of the following people: Peter Stan, RAND Corporation; Roland Herbst, R&D Associates; Maxwell Hunter, retired from Lockheed [redacted] and possibly others as mutually agreeable. We expect this initial task to take about eight months from completion of clearances, and approximately 250 man-days.

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We would require access to collection programs across the community, at a level at least equal to that which Bill and I have had in the past. Needless to say, the study would be for the Director and yourself.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Angelo M. Codevilla".

Angelo M. Codevilla
William R. Harris